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The Supreme Court's Mixed Messages on
the Public Domain:
Cases Interpreting Section 43 of the
Lanham Act
BY WILLIAM SCOTT HUNT*
INTRODUCTION
n his trademark and unfair competition treatise, Professor J.
Thomas McCarthy confidently states that "'public domain' is the
status of an invention, creative work, commercial symbol, or any other
creation that is not protected by any form of intellectual property. Public
domain is the rule; intellectual property is the exception."' While still
true on one level, today many scholars contend that rights in intellectual
property have expanded to the point of endangering the continuing
vitality of the public domain.2 For these scholars, "the public domain and
copyright are inversely correlated: If one grows, the other must shrink.
Intellectual property must therefore be restricted if the public domain is
to be large and robust."-
3
Of course, there are opposing opinions. Professor R. Polk Wagner
argues that it is possible to increase control over intellectual property and
for the public domain to flourish even more greatly than without such
* J.D. expected 2005, University of Kentucky; B.S. 2001, Centre College. I would
like to thank Professor Harold Weinberg for his assistance in selecting this topic and in
editing portions of this note. I would also like to thank my wife, family, and friends for
their support and immense patience during my law school career.
'1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION
§ 1:2 (4th ed. 2003).
2 See, e.g., James Boyle, The Second Enclosure Movement and the Construction of
the Public Domain, 66 SPG LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 33 (2003) (comparing the
contemporary expansion of intellectual property with the English enclosure movement,
concluding that both have few, if any, positive effects); Rosemary J. Coombe, Fear,
Hope, and Longing for the Future of Authorship and a Revitalized Public Domain in
Global Regimes of Intellectual Property, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 1171, 1173 (2003)
(recognizing that "[Il]egal protections for intellectual property [may be] expanding to the
detriment of new creators"); see also Paul M. Schwartz & William Michael Treanor,
Eldred and Lochner: Copyright Term Extension and Intellectual Property as
Constitutional Property, 112 YALE L.J. 2331, 2337-38 (2003) (discussing scholars who
believe intellectual property rights require close scrutiny in the context of copyright term
extension).
3 Schwartz & Treanor, supra note 2, at 2337.
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controls.4 Wagner theorizes that the real impact of many intellectual
property proposals on the public domain depends not on the direct effect
upon the public domain, but on the effect upon incentives generally.' At
first blush, a policy that restricts the public domain could, the argument
goes, create incentives that ultimately encourage a more expansive public
domain.6
Both lines of thought primarily emphasize the perceived (and
arguably real)7 increases in authorial intellectual property rights.8 The
many developments in digital technology over the last fifteen years and
the fallout from the Supreme Court's decision in Eldred v. Ashcrof 9
focus attention in this direction. However, because emphasis is placed on
the expansion of these rights and its effect on the public domain, little is
said about concurrent efforts to protect the public domain.
This note argues that, despite the expansion of intellectual property
rights, the Court is actively protecting the public domain in defined
ways. This general argument is made in the context of the Court's
approach to recent cases interpreting § 43 of the Lanham Act; a section
that is particularly vulnerable to use as a means to extend the scope or
period of intellectual property protections.'0 Careful analysis of these
cases illustrates the Court's concern for the continuation of a vibrant
public domain despite notable expansions to the scope and time period
for certain protections. The recent Supreme Court decisions discussed in
this note reinforce the idea that, "[i]n general, unless an intellectual
property right. . . protects an item, it will be subject to copying."" Some
12of these decisions make it harder to assert intellectual property rights,
4 See R. Polk Wagner, Information Wants to be Free: Intellectual Property and the
Mythologies of Control, 103 COLUM. L. REv. 995, 997 (2003).
5 See id. at 1023.
6Id.
7 See, e.g., Boyle, supra note 2, at 38. Boyle provides specific examples of increased
intellectual property protection, commenting that "[t]he expansion of intellectual property
rights has been remarkable-from business method patents, to the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act, to trademark antidilution rulings, to the European Database Protection
Directive. The old limits to intellectual property rights-the anti-erosion walls around the
public domain-are also under attack." Id. (footnotes omitted).
8 See supra notes 2-4 and accompanying text.
9 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (extending the term of existing and new
copyrights by twenty years, thus creating extensive public and scholarly debate about
Congress' power to take this action and its effect on the public domain).
'0 Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (2004). For a discussion of the unique causes of
action provided under § 43 and the reasons this section is particularly vulnerable to abuse
for the improper extension of intellectual property rights, see infra Part lIlA.
u MCCARTHY, supra note 1, at § 1:2.
12 See e.g., Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418 (2003) (holding that
the Federal Trademark Dilution Act requires proof of actual dilution); Wal-Mart Stores,
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while others strengthen the lines between the bodies of intellectual
property law to prevent overlapping protection that will impermissibly
extend the time it takes the subject matter to enter the public domain.13
These cases do not refute that intellectual property rights have expanded,
but rather demonstrate that, concurrent with this expansion, the Court
remains conscious of the need to protect the public domain.
Part I of this note addresses the basic tradeoffs inherent in
intellectual property law and the policy objectives of each area of that
law.14 Copyright, trademark, and patent law each involve unique
considerations regarding public domain policy because of the core
differences between them. This section also gives a basic overview of
what concerns drive each part of intellectual property law and begins to
relate those concerns to important policy questions about the public
domain. Part II defines the scope of the public domain and addresses the
changing views of its importance over time.' 5 Part III then discusses a
number of cases construing the Lanham Act that may be read as attempts
by the Supreme Court to strengthen the public domain, making it more
difficult to claim intellectual property protections. 16 These cases stand in
contrast to highly publicized expansions of authorial or property rights in
intellectual property. Particular attention is given to Dastar Corp. v.
Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp.17 and to the Court's refusal to allow
indefinite protection to previously copyrighted or patented materials via
the Lanham Act. Finally, Part IV discusses the repercussions of these
decisions by analyzing their effect on the future of the public domain.
18
I. BASIC FEDERAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY TRADEOFFS AND POLICY
A. Tension between Ownership Rights in Intellectual Property and
Public Access
Within patent, copyright, and trademark law, there exists a tension
between the exclusive rights granted to the owner of the intellectual
Inc. v. Samara Bros., 529 U.S. 205 (2000) (holding that a claim of trade dress
infringement under the Lanham Act requires a showing of secondary meaning).
13 See, e.g., Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23 (2003)
(holding that § 43(a) of the Lanham Act does not prevent unaccredited copying of
uncopyrighted work); TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23
(2001) (allowing expired utility patent to serve as strong evidence of functionality in
trade dress infringement suit).14 See infra notes 19-44 and accompanying text.
15 See infra notes 45-64 and accompanying text.
16 See infra notes 65-180 and accompanying text.
17 Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23 (2003).
18 See infra notes 181-200 and accompanying text.
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property and the degree to and manner in which the property will be
available to the public.' 9 Generally, this tension defines public domain
material free for public use and the important intellectual property rights
that attach, which allow the holder of the right to control, to varying
degrees, the activities of others in relation to the material.2 Due to the
different purposes and the specific nature of each body of intellectual
property law, the considerations factoring into this tension are not
uniform among them.
21
1. Patent Law
The basis for both patent and copyright law is constitutional. The
Intellectual Property Clause of the United States Constitution allows
Congress to "promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right
to their respective Writings and Discoveries ...,22 The language of this
grant of power means that both patents and copyrights must be limited in
the length of time they are effective.
The primary tension in patent law exists between rewarding and
protecting the patent grantee while avoiding limitations on potential
future advancements that may arise because of these exclusive rights.23
Patent law operates on the "assumption that a period of exclusivity is
needed to induce the optimum level of innovation. 24 This tension has
been apparent since the birth of Constitution: "the drafters . . .
understood that patent law seeks to strike a balance between the
promotion of technological creativity and the dissemination of its
fruits.
25
As a result, patents granted today are limited to twenty-year terms.
z6
During this period, inventors possess the exclusive right, among other
rights, to prevent anyone from making, using, offering to sell, or selling
the patented invention without authority.27 Thus, a balance in patent law
19 See ROCHELLE COOPER DREYFUSS & ROBERTA ROSENTHAL KWALL, INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY 1-2 (1996).
20 See id. at 3.
21 See id. at 1-3.
22 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
23 See DREYFUSS & KWALL, supra note 19, at 553.
24 Id.
25 SHELDON W. HALPERN ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF UNITED STATES INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LAW: COPYRIGHT, PATENT, AND TRADEMARK 181 (1999).
26 DREYFUSS & KWALL, supra note 19, at 552 ("For most patents filed on January 1,
1995 or later, the term of protection is 20 years from the date the patent application was
filed.").
27 See Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2004).
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allowing for public access is sought via a number of factors: 1) the
limited term; 2) the stringent requirements to receive a patent; and 3) a
mandate that patents be included on a public registry to "describe to the
world the metes and bounds of the registered invention. 28
2. Copyright Law
The authority for the copyright system also rests in the Intellectual
Property Clause of the Constitution.29 Not surprisingly, the basic goals of
copyright, rewarding the author and ensuring public access, are very
similar to those of patent. Both "attempt to balance the private benefits of
exclusivity against these social costs" of keeping new ideas from society
and allowing the potential for monopoly prices. 30 Thus, copyright
primarily seeks to secure public access while also encouraging creativity
by providing some rewards to individuals "by securing for limited Times
to Authors ... the exclusive Right to their respective Writings."
3
1
Copyright protection may generally be viewed as weaker than patent
protection. A copyright carries with it the exclusive rights listed in § 106
of the 1976 Copyright Act, 32 which "are subject to the highly specific
limitations and exemptions set out in Sections 108 through 121. These
exclusive rights and accompanying exceptions create a system that does
28 DREYFUSS & KWALL, supra note 19, at 554. Dreyfuss and Kwall note that the
patent registry system solves the problem of "Arrow's disclosure paradox." Arrow's
disclosure paradox deals essentially with the problem faced by an inventor who has an
idea that may be expensive to build, thus requiring outside financing, but is reluctant to
disclose the idea for fear the idea will be appropriated. Patent law assuages this fear and
encourages disclosure and invention. See id
29 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
30 DREYFUSS & KWALL, supra note 19, at 553.
31 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, el. 8.
32 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2004) grants the owner of a copyright "the exclusive rights to do
and to authorize any of the following:
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords;
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work;
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the
public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending;
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,
pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform the
copyrighted work publicly;
(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,
pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including individual
images of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to display the
copyrighted work publicly; and
(6) in the case of sound recordings, to perform the copyrighted work
publicly by means of a digital audio transmission.
Id. 33 HALPERN ET AL., supra note 25, at 66-67.
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not allow the copyright holder to exert as much control over the subject
material as a patent holder. The term of a copyright depends on its
method of creation, but it is longer than the term of a patent-typically a
certain number of years after publication, creation, or death of the
author.34 It is through the Fair Use Doctrine3' and the exemptions in
sections 108-121 of the Copyright Act 36 that access to copyrighted
works is protected.
3. Trademark Law
Trademark law is fundamentally different from patent and copyright.
Trademark does not spring from an explicit constitutional grant, but
rather is based on Congress' Commerce Clause powers.37 As a result,
"[w]hile copyrights (and patent rights) expire before falling into the
public domain-regardless of use or nonuse by the owner-trademarks
do not terminate so long as the user continues to use them and maintain
proper registration" under the federal system.38 This difference in the
term of trademarks, when considered alongside the public's "right to
copy, and to copy without attribution, once a copyright" or a patent
expires, has important implications for the scope of the public domain.39
The primary access issue in trademarks is also different. Trademarks
carry no requirement "to promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts.' '4 As a result, the requirements to obtain a trademark do not inquire
into the original or creative aspects of the work.41 Instead, obtaining a
trademark requires only use of the mark and that the mark serve some
source identifying function.42 The tradeoff thus comes from a desire to
34 Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §§ 302-305 (2004) cover the various terms of
copyrights. The term of all copyrights, both existing and future, was extended by twenty
years by the Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, §102(b), 102(d), 112
Stat. 2827-2828 (amending 17 U.S.C. §§302-304), which was upheld in Eldred v.
Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 194 (2003).
" See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2004).
36 §§ 108-121.
37 See HALPERN ET AL., supra note 25, at 275.
38 Jessica Bohrer, iBrief, Strengthening the Distinction between Copyright and
Trademark: The Supreme Court Takes a Stand, 2003 DuKE L. & TECH. REv. 23, 8
(Sept. 30, 2003), at http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/dltr/articles/2003dtr0023.html
(footnote omitted).
39 Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 33 (2003). The
potential importance of this difference for the public domain becomes even clearer in the
discussion of the intersection of the bodies of intellectual property law in Part III, infra
notes 65-180.
40 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
41 DREYFuss & KWALL, supra note 19, at 6.
421Id. at 10-1 1.
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protect and encourage the trademark holder's investment in goodwill
(and to lessen the likelihood of consumer confusion at the same time)
while allowing sufficient marks to remain available for others to carry on
similar businesses.43 Public access is generally encouraged in this area
through the use requirement and through geographic and temporal scope
limitations. 4
4
11. THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: THE OPPOSITE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY?
A. A Brief Historical Perspective of the Public Domain Concept
Intellectual property law begins with the proposition that information
belongs in the public domain and that the protections afforded by the
bodies of intellectual property law are merely exceptions to this general
rule.45 This idea is evident in the Constitution's Intellectual Property
Clause.4 6 Patents and copyrights may be granted "for limited Times"
only.47 Thus, the clause's language makes it implicitly clear that the
Framers ultimately intended the public domain to be enriched by the
protected information.4t
The public domain is not a mere byproduct of the intellectual
property system in the United States; it is an integral part of that system,
tracing back to the text of the Constitution: "[t]he ultimate purpose of
patents and copyrights authorized by the clause is to enlarge the public
domain of creative works by authors and inventors, thereby promoting
'the progress of science and useful arts." 49 For example, in the context
of patents, the Court has stated that "implicit in the Patent Clause itself,
[is the idea] that free exploitation of ideas will be the rule, to which the
protection of a federal patent is the exception.,
50
B. Present Day Concerns about the Vitality of the Public Domain
Despite the clear importance of the public domain within United
States intellectual property law, there is much concern that it is being
4 3
1 Id. at 6-8.
44 See generally Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart's Food Stores, Inc., 267 F.2d 358, 360 (2d
Cir. 1959) (holding that the defendant could continue using a mark registered by the
plaintiff because it was used in a different geographic area and different market segment).
45 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, at § 1:2.
46 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
41 See id.
48 See EDWARD C. WALTERSCHEID, THE NATURE OF THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
CLAUSE: A STUDY IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 266 (2002).
49 Id. See also id. at 271 (noting that the Framers intended that protected works
should enter into the public domain after a period of time).
50 Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 151 (1989).
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forgotten and even trammeled by changes to the law. As Professor
Lawrence Lessig notes concerning this increasing trend, "[s]o invisible is
[the] public domain that we don't even see it when it is everywhere
around; so invisible is the idea that the free might matter to creativity,
that when it is enclosed we are convinced this is progress."
51
A noteworthy example of this trend, and a lightning rod for debate
during the' past year, is the Supreme Court's decision in Eldred v.
Ashcroft,52 which upheld the extension of the term of both new and
existing copyrights by twenty years. Professor Lessig was counsel for the
losing side in Eldred and is one of many scholars for whom this decision
has generated concern about the robustn ess and continued existence of
the public domain.53 The decision in Eldred was without doubt a boost to
those who desire greater authorial rights in intellectual property. It is
even more noteworthy with regard to the public domain because of the
Copyright Term Extension Act's retroactive effect.5 4 While it is true that
the copyrighted works will still eventually enter the public domain, the
tradeoff balancing these authorial rights and public access has been
changed in the copyright holder's favor.
With regard to changes in property or ownership rights in intellectual
property, at least two opposing views are predominant. The group most
concerned about developments like that seen in Eldred is the "IP
Restrictors., 5 5 Scholars in this camp believe in "the need to preserve a
rich public domain; . . . that the Copyright Clause enshrines a quid pro
quo theory . . . and that the Framers . . . opposed copyright term
extension as rent-seeking."56 The IP Restrictors value the public domain
as a way to reduce costs for consumers and to help creators and
innovators produce more intellectual property.57 These beliefs lead to the
5 Lawrence Lessig, The Architecture of Innovation, Lecture at the Duke University
School of Law Conference on the Public Domain (Nov. 9-12, 2001), in 51 DuKE L.J.
1783, 1799 (2002) [hereinafter Lessig, Architecture ofInnovation] (referring specifically
to the Walt Disney Company's. use of large amounts of public domain material which it
now seeks to protect as its own and which the public largely does not question as
belonging to it).
- Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003).
53 See, e.g., Schwartz & Treanor, supra note 2, at 2338-39.
14 Eldred, 537 U.S. at 193 (noting that the CTEA applied to existing as well as
future copyrights).
55 See Schwartz & Treanor, supra note 2, at 2332-33 (applying this moniker to
scholars who fear encroachment on the public domain by expansion in the copyright
laws).
56 Id. at 2337. Rent-seeking is defined as "[elcononiic behavior motivated by an
incentive to overproduce goods that will yield a return greater than the cost of
production." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1300 (7th ed. 1999).
51 Schwartz & Treanor, supra note 2, at 2337-38.
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common conclusion that intellectual property rights must be carefully
controlled in order to ensure a healthy public domain. 58
Professor R. Polk Wagner takes a position directly opposed to the IP
Restrictors.59 Wagner argues that the changes to United States intel-
lectual property law (granting more control or ownership rights) do not
60inevitably lead to a reduction in material that enters the public domain.
Wagner particularly takes issue with the line of thought expressed by
Professor James Boyle, that we are witnessing an "enclosure movement"
in intellectual property via the extension of greater authorial rights.6' The
idea that none of the bodies of intellectual property law actually capture,
or are even capable of completely capturing, the value of the thing
sought to be protected leads to this conclusion.62 Wagner instead ad-
vances the argument that the true measure of a policy's effect on the
public domain depends upon whether it increases or decreases incentives
to create new intellectual property. 63 According to Wagner, the potential
exists for a net increase in public domain information despite increasing
rights in the intellectual property itself.64
It is widely agreed that property rights in intellectual property are
expanding. As seen in this discussion, concern is expressed over the
effect this increase will have on the public domain and the intellectual
property system. A number of recent Supreme Court decisions limiting
intellectual property rights in the trademark and trade secret arenas are
central to determining the scope of the public domain.
III. STRENGTHENING THE PUBLIC DOMAIN BY MAKING IT HARDER TO
CLAIM PROTECTION
A. The Changing Role of Lanham Act Section 43
Recent Supreme Court decisions involving § 43 of the Lanham Act
65
have demonstrated an intention to protect the public domain and curb its
use to extend authorial rights. Section 43 provides for several causes of
action, some of which have been abused to extend intellectual property
protection to material that belongs in the public domain.66 Additionally,
58 
ld.
59 See Wagner, supra note 4, at 997.
60id.
61 Id. at 996, 1034. See generally Boyle, supra note 2, at 37 (referring to the
expansion of intellectual property rights as "the second enclosure movement").
62 See Wagner, supra note 4, at 1002-03.
63 1d. at 1023.
64 ld. at 1023-24.
65 Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (2004).
66 See infra Part III.B-C.
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several circuit splits that resulted from interpretation of claims under this
section have been resolved by recent Supreme Court decisions.67
Section 43(a) is particularly unique within the trademark statute
because it provides a cause of action for unregistered marks.68 Section
43(a) allows the owner of an unregistered mark to bring suit "against one
who uses that mark in a manner which may cause confusion as to the
origin or sponsorship of goods or services" or makes false represen-
tations about the goods or services.69 Trade dress, the overall appearance,
packaging, and design of an item, has found protection under this section
of the Lanham Act.70
The traditional model for trademark infringement cases involves
"passing off," which occurs when the potential infringer attempts to
persuade others that his goods are actually the trademark holder's
goods.71 "Reverse passing off' also exists. In this situation, the potential
infringer misrepresents the trademark holder's goods as his own.
72
Historically, reverse passing off arose in situations where goods were
stripped of their labels, relabeled, and then sold.73 A more interesting,
and controversial, form known as "authorial reverse passing off' has
arisen under § 43. Authorial reverse passing off involves the "misleading
attribution of authorship. 74 Under this approach, "reverse passing off in
violation of section 43(a) was found in fact patterns in which a defendant
copied a work" to which copyright protection was available.75 This
approach could essentially extend the term of protection for a copyright
holder indefinitely or provide protection for non-copyrightable subject
67 See id.
68 HALPERN ET AL., supra note 25, at 336.
69 Id. Lanham Act § 43(a)(1)(B), codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(B), also
provides a cause of action for false advertising but is not relevant to the cases discussed
in this note.
70 See, e.g., Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 775 (1992) (holding
that "secondary meaning is not required to prevail on a claim under § 43(a) of the
Lanham Act where the trade dress at issue is inherently distinctive"); Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc. v. Samara Bros., 529 U.S. 205, 209 (2000) (explaining that trade dress "originally
included only the packaging or 'dressing,' of a product, but in recent years has been
expanded by many Courts of Appeals to encompass the design of a product[]") (citations
omitted).
71 See DREYFuss & KWALL, supra note 19, at 75.
72 David A. Gerber, Copyright Reigns-Supreme: Notes on Dastar Corp. v.
Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 93 TRADEMARK REP. 1029 (2003).
71 See id. at 1030 ("the pre-Act cases generally sought to redress the deceptive
physical removal or obliteration of labels").
74 Id. Gerber notes that one of the first instances of this occurring was in Smith v.
Montoro, 648 F.2d 602, 603 (9th Cir. 1981), "in which a film distributor substituted a
fictitious name for that of a real actor in a feature motion picture." Gerber, supra note 72,
at 1030.
75 Id.
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matter, thus creating a potential overlap and conflict between trademark
and copyright.
7 6
Section 43(c) provides a cause of action for dilution. This cause of
action was long recognized at common law, but a federal codification of
the right occurred only when it was added to the Lanham Act in 1996 by
the Federal Trademark Dilution Act.77 "Dilution" is defined in the
Lanham Act as "the lessening of the capacity of a famous mark to
identify and distinguish goods or services."7 8 Application of this standard
also resulted in a recently resolved circuit split.79 The circuits were
unclear whether, "Congress intended 'actual dilution' or 'likelihood of
dilution"' under the Lanham Act.80 The Supreme Court resolved this
question in favor of an "actual dilution" requirement in Moseley v.
Victoria's Secret Catalogue, Inc., wherein Victoria's Secret was required
to prove actual economic harm inflicted by another business using a
similar name.81 Therefore, the Court strengthened its commitment to the
public domain by making it more difficult to claim dilution.
B. Specific Requirements Making Section 43 Claims More Difficult
1. Requirements Imposed to Receive Trade Dress Protection
In its 2000 decision, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros. ,82 the
Supreme Court imposed limitations on how certain types of unregistered
trade dress may be granted protection under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act.
The Court noted in Samara that many courts of appeals had interpreted
§ 43(a):
to embrace not just word marks, such as "Nike," and symbol marks,
such as Nike's "swoosh" symbol, but also "trade dress"-a category
that originally included only the packaging, or "dressing," of a product,
but in recent years has been expanded by many courts of appeals to
encompass the design of a product.
83
76 See infra Part III.C for a more in-depth discussion of this point.
77 See GLEN BELVIS, 2003 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW UPDATE 256 (2003).
78 Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2004).
79 Moscley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418 (2003) (resolving the circuit
split by requiring "actual" dilution under the Lanham Act).
80 JEROME GILSON & ANNE GILSON LALONDE, THE LANHAM ACT: TIME FOR A FACE
LiT? 16-17 (2002). See also BELVIS, supra note 77, at 256-59.
81 See infra notes 82-105 and accompanying text for a discussion of this decision.
82 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., 529 U.S. 205 (2000).
83 Id. at 209.
2004-2005]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
The Court granted certiorari to clarify the proper scope of the protection
offered by § 43(a). 4
In Samara, Samara Brothers manufactured a children's clothing line
sold to J.C. Penney.85 The line included one-piece seersucker outfits with
appliqu6s of certain designs on them.86 Wal-Mart requested that one of
its suppliers copy the designs for Wal-Mart to sell, even providing the
supplier with pictures of the outfits made by Samara Brothers.8 The
supplier then manufactured copies, which Wal-Mart sold.88 Samara
Brothers subsequently filed suit against Wal-Mart claiming trade dress
infringement under § 43(a).89
The Samara Court found for Wal-Mart, holding that product design
had been copied, that product design is only protectable on a showing of
secondary meaning, and that Samara Brothers failed to establish
secondary meaning. 90 In so holding, the Court noted that "trade dress
constitutes a 'symbol' or 'device' and that "human beings might use as
a 'symbol' or 'device' almost anything at all that is capable of carrying
meaning." 91 However, the Court found that "[i]n the case of product
design, as in the case of color. . . consumer predisposition to equate the
feature with the source does not exist., 92 As a result, the Court in Samara
held that, for product design to be granted protection under § 43(a) of the
Lanham Act, the claimant must make a showing of secondary meaning.
93
Further, the Samara Court made clear in dictum that, where it is not
altogether clear whether the subject matter being addressed is product
design trade dress or product packaging, "courts should err on the side of
caution and classify ambiguous trade dress as product design, thereby
requiring secondary meaning."94 The Court expressed this position after
14 Id. at 208.
5 Id. at 207.
86 Id.
87 Id.
88 Id. at 207-08.
89 Id. at 208.
9' See id. at 215-16.
91 Id. at 209-10 (quoting Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159 (1995),
which held that color could serve as a trademark upon a showing of secondary meaning).92 1d. at 213.
93 Id. at 216. Secondary meaning in this context refers to whether consumers would
interpret the design features as serving source identification functions. This differs from
secondary meaning in other contexts of trademark law because, unlike with word and
symbol marks, no primary meaning may exist in the case of design. See id. at 211.
94 Id. at 215. The Court distinguished between three types of trade dress: 1) product
design, 2) product packaging, and 3) "some tertium quid that is akin to product
packaging." Id. at 214-15. Along with recognizing these different types of trade dress,
the Court notes that each communicates a different level of distinctiveness to the
consumer, and they vary according to whether a showing of secondary meaning is
required for protection. See id. at 214.
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distinguishing Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc.95 Two Pesos
extended protection under § 43(a) to the trade dress of a chain of
Mexican-themed restaurants without requiring a showing of secondary
meaning, on the grounds that it involved a form of trade dress other than
product design.96 The respondent in Samara feared it would be too
difficult in some cases to distinguish between product design and product
packaging trade dress.97 In response, the Court adopted a presumption in
favor of product design in close cases.98 This choice broadens the scope
of subject matter that requires a showing of secondary meaning to
receive protection under § 43(a), thus emphasizing protection of the
public domain.
The Samara decision curbed the expansion of protection afforded
unregistered trade dress in the lower courts. By doing so, and allowing
blatant copying by Wal-Mart, the Court reaffirmed that in many cases
copying is permissible, and that intellectual property protection is the
exception and not the rule. This decision, though in a narrow context,
demonstrates the Court's commitment to strengthening the public
domain. Additionally, and perhaps even more significantly for the
present discussion, Samara reflects a change in the direction of the
Court's own jurisprudence toward strengthening the public domain. The
Court decided Two Pesos in 1992;99 three years later, in Qualitex Co. v.
Jacobson Products Co., it held that color could function as a trademark
with a showing of secondary meaning. 100 In light of these two earlier
decisions, Samara indicates a slowing and refining of the Court's own
willingness to expand intellectual property protections. Samara clarifies
and retreats from the Two Pesos trend toward expanding rights by
treating as inherently distinctive the types of trade dress that may be
protected under § 43(a), and by expanding the scope of those that may
require secondary meaning. 101
95 Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763 (1992).
96 Samara, 529 U.S. at 215. The trade dress of the Mexican restaurants included
festive decorations, paintings and murals. See id. The Court stated:
Two Pesos unquestionably establishes the legal principle that trade dress
can be inherently distinctive, but it does not establish that product-design trade
dress can be. Two Pesos is inapposite to our holding here because the trade
dress at issue, the d6ecor of a restaurant, seems to us not to constitute product
design.
Id. (citation omitted).
97 id.
981d.
99 See supra notes 95-96 and accompanying text.
1o0 See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 161 (1995).
'01 See Samara, 529 U.S. at 214-15 ("drawing the line" by holding that product
design trade dress requires a showing of secondary meaning). See also Two Pesos, 505
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Similarly, Samara provides more protection to the public domain by
refusing to go as far as Qualitex. Both Samara and Qualitex support the
Court's stance requiring secondary meaning for characteristics that do
not automatically have source-identifying functions in consumers'
minds.10 2 However, while Qualitex extended the right to register color
with a showing of secondary meaning as a trademark under the Lanham
Act, 10 3 Samara did not allow the same for product design with a showing
of secondary meaning.104 In Samara, the Court was only willing to allow
protection through § 43(a) for product design. 05 This difference, though
slight, also supports the idea that the Court is becoming less willing to
extend property rights in intellectual property.
2. Requirements Imposed for Dilution Claims
Recently the Supreme Court resolved a circuit split interpreting a
relatively new addition to the Lanham Act: the Federal Trademark
Dilution Act of 1996.'06 The split concerned what must be shown to
prove dilution under the federal statute. The 2003 Intellectual Property
Law Update10 7 notes that, prior to the Supreme Court's decision in
Moseley v. Victoria's Secret Catalogue, Inc.,'10 the Fourth'09 and Fifth" °
Circuits followed an "actual dilution" standard. Meanwhile, the
Second,"' Third,"' Sixth," 3 and Seventh 1 4 Circuits all required a
U.S. at 773-74 ("expanding the scope" through recognition of trade dress as inherently
distinctive and protected by § 43(a)).
102 Samara, 529 U.S. at 215; Qualitex Co., 514 U.S. at 171.
103 Qualitex Co., 514 U.S. at 163.
'o4 Samara, 529 U.S. at 215.
105 Id.
106 Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2004).
107 BELVIS, supra note 77, at 258-59.
108 Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418 (2003) (holding that proof of
"actual" dilution is required for recovery).
109 See Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of
Travel Dev., 170 F.3d 449, 461 (4th Cir. 1999) (holding that proof of "actual" dilution is
required).
110 See Westchester Media v. PRL USA Holdings, Inc., 214 F.3d 658, 670 (5th Cir.
2000) (adopting the Fourth Circuit requirement of "actual" dilution for Fifth Circuit
cases,?, See Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208, 223-25 (2d Cir. 1999)
(rejecting the requirement of "actual" dilution and authorizing actions based on
"likelihood" of dilution).
112 See Times Mirror Magazines, Inc. v. Las Vegas Sports News, L.L.C., 212 F.3d
157, 168-69 (3d Cir. 2000) (adopting a "likelihood" of dilution standard).
113 See V Secret Catalogue, Inc. v. Moseley, 259 F.3d 464, 476 (6th Cir. 2001),
rev'd, 537 U.S. 418 (2003).
114 See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Natural Answers, Inc., 233 F.3d 456, 459 (7th Cir. 2000)
(requiring only "likelihood" of dilution).
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showing of "likelihood of dilution." ' 15 The Court in Moseley sided with
the Fourth and Fifth Circuits, holding that actual dilution in the
consumer's mind must be shown." 6
In Moseley, the petitioners ran a small business called "Victor's
Little Secret," located in a strip mall in Elizabethtown, Kentucky.1 17 The
store primarily sold lingerie and adult novelties.118 To announce the
store's grand opening, the owners of Victor's Little Secret placed an ad
in a publication at a nearby Army base, Fort Knox." 9 An Army lawyer,
Colonel John E. "Jeb" Baker, claimed to be offended by what he saw as
the store's use of another's trademark and notified Victoria's Secret
Catalogue Company. 20 Victoria's Secret requested that Victor's Little
Secret stop using the name because of potential dilution of its mark.'
2'
When Victor's Little Secret refused to stop, Victoria's Secret filed a
complaint alleging federal dilution under § 43(c) of the Lanham Act.
22
In Moseley, the Supreme Court examined the legislative history and
approaches of the lower circuits, 123 but the Court based its final decision
on the plain language of the statute, saying, "[t]his text unambiguously
requires a showing of actual dilution, rather than a likelihood of
dilution."' 24 Victoria's Secret failed to make the requisite showing of
actual dilution resulting from Moseley's use of the name "Victor's Little
Secret.' 25 Accordingly, the Court reversed the Sixth Circuit and allowed
Moseley to continue using his at least partially borrowed mark.1
26
By landing in the actual dilution camp, the Supreme Court made it
more difficult to prove dilution in many cases under § 43(c) of the
Lanham Act. The Court dismissed this concern, saying, "[w]hatever
difficulties of proof may be entailed, they are not an acceptable reason
for dispensing with proof of an essential element of a statutory
5 BELVIS, supra note 77, at 258 (citing cases supra notes 109-115).
116 See Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 432-33 (2003).
"
7 Id. at 422.
"' Id. at 424.
"9 Id. at 423.
120 Bill Adair, Victor vs. Victoria, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Nov. 17, 2002, at IA,
available at http:// www.sptimes.com/ 2002/11/17/ Worldandnation/Victor vs Victoria.
shtmil.
121 Moseley, 537 U.S. at 423.
122 id.
'23 ld. at 425-31.
124 Id. at 433 (referring to the language of 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2004)).
125 Id. at 434.
126 Jd. Victor Moseley apparently was not always certain the Court would reach this
result, saying on his way into the Supreme Court before the oral argument in his case,
"'See that up there-it says 'Equal Justice Under Law.' They've got to convince me... I
have no faith in the justice system whatsoever. I think money buys you whatever you
want."' Adair, supra note 120.
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violation."' 27 This decision shows the Supreme Court again taking a
position favoring public access and the public domain. A likelihood-of-
dilution standard not only would have made it significantly easier to
claim dilution because the level of proof would be much lower, but it
also would have protected marks more strongly as a type of property
since only the likelihood of harm would need to be shown. A standard
that allowed dilution without any damage to the mark's source-
identifying function or the goodwill engendered by the owner would
punish simple use of the mark itself, which does not further the true
purpose of trademark law.' 28 By requiring such a high standard of proof
for parties claiming dilution, the Court effectively denies protection to
the mark itself while also protecting the public's ability to use marks by
narrowing the scope of the trademark holder's rights.
C. Strengthening the Lines between the Bodies of Intellectual Property
Law
Recent Supreme Court decisions have prevented § 43(a) of the
Lanham Act from being used to extend the protection of expired patents
indefinitely 129 or as a limitation on the public's right to copy and use
expired copyrights. 130 Such decisions guard the public domain by
narrowing any potential overlap between the bodies of intellectual
property law that would permit matter to be protected longer than
envisioned under the tradeoffs underlying our system. As the following
cases illustrate, the Supreme Court is conscious that some may try to
obtain more protection than permissible, and it is unwilling to allow the
potential consequences this may have for the public domain. 3'
1. The Line between Trademark and Patent
The Supreme Court made clear in TrajFix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing
Displays, Inc. 132 that, in a claim for trade dress infringement, an expired
utility patent will serve as "strong evidence that the features" claimed in
127 Moseley, 537 U.S. at 434.
128 See supra notes 37-44 and accompanying text.
.29 See TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 30-31 (2001)
(holding that an expired patent covering a functional feature cannot receive trade dress
protection).
130 See Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 529 U.S. 23, 32 (2003)
(holding that the Lanham Act does not prevent the unaceredited copying of an
uncopyrighted work).
131 See infra notes 132-180 and accompanying text.
132 TrajFix, 532 U.S. at 23.
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the patent are functional.133 This, in turn, creates a rebuttable
presumption that the features do not enjoy trade dress protection.1 34 The
rationale behind this approach lies in the functionality doctrine of
trademark law. 135 Functional features are not subject to protection under
the Lanham Act.136 As the Court noted, this is partially because "[t]he
Lanham Act does not exist to reward manufacturers for their innovation
in creating a particular device; that is the purpose of patent law and its
period of exclusivity.' 137 Since there is a high likelihood that a utility
patent covers functional features, the presumption against trade dress
protection arises.
138
TrafFix involved Marketing Displays, Inc. ("MDI"), a company that
sold temporary outdoor road signs incorporating a dual-spring design.
139
The unique design allowed the signs to stay upright in strong winds.
140
Patents on the dual-spring design had expired and MDI held the expired
patents. 14 TrafFix reverse engineered the design used by MDI and began
selling copies of the signs. 42 MDI filed a complaint alleging trade dress
infringement under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act as one of its claims.
143
This case was also heard in the Sixth Circuit and involved a circuit split
on "whether the existence of an expired utility patent forecloses the
possibility of the patentee's claiming trade dress protection in the
product's design."'144 The Court granted certiorari and proceeded, once
again, to reverse the Sixth Circuit.
145
The Court held that MDI could not bring an action for trade dress
infringement against TrafFix. 146 This holding hinged on the fact that
MDI was seeking to protect, via § 43(a), material claimed in the expired
' Id. at 29-30 (emphasis added) ("If trade dress protection is sought for those
features the strong evidence of functionality based on the previous patent adds great
weight to the statutory presumption that features are deemed functional until proved
otherwise.").
134 1d
135 Functional features of products may not receive trademark protection. In making
the functionality determination, the Court distinguishes between and applies different
tests for those features that are useful and those that are aesthetic. Qualitex Co. v.
Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 164-70 (1995).
1
36 
ld. at 165.
137 TrafFix, 532 U.S. at 34.
13s See id. at 29-30.
139 Id. at 25.
140 id.
141 id.
142 Id. at 26.
143 Id.
'44Id. at 28.
1451d at 35.
146 ld. at 34-35.
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patents. 147 The expired patents raised a presumption of functionality for
the material claimed, making trademark protection unavailable. 141
Further, allowing MDI to have protection under § 43(a) for the same
features claimed in the expired patents would extend the expired
monopoly, thus disturbing the tradeoff inherent in the issuance of any
patent. 149 At least in part, the desire to protect the basic policy tradeoff
behind the patent system motivated this decision,1 50 but the TraJFix
Court was also explicit in its desire to protect the public domain and
allow copying.' 5' The Court reiterated that "copying is not always
discouraged or disfavored by the laws which preserve our competitive
economy."1 52 The Court continued: "Allowing competitors to copy will
have salutary effects in many instances. Reverse engineering of...
articles in the public domain often leads to significant advances in
technology."'
15 3
The standard of functionality adopted in TrafFix is a testament to the
Court's desire to protect copying. Patent protection requires a showing of
utility for the features claimed. 54 By holding that expired utility patents
carry strong evidentiary significance that a device for which trade dress
protection is sought is functional,155 the Court imposed a high threshold
for such patents. Thus, this inquiry complements and adds to the
functionality considerations for trademarks discussed in Qualitex which
already narrow the scope of material that may be protected and removed
from the public domain.
5 6
The TrafFix Court was even more concerned with clarifying the lines
between the bodies of intellectual property law than it was in its earlier
117 Id. at 34.
148 It is worth noting that the Court in TrafFix distinguished the situation where the
material sought to be protected under § 43(a) was not functional, stating:
In a case where a manufacturer seeks to protect arbitrary, incidental, or
ornamental aspects of features of a product found in the patent claims, such as
arbitrary curves in the legs or an ornamental pattern painted on the springs, a
different result might obtain. There the manufacturer could perhaps prove that
those aspects do not serve a purpose within the terms of the utility patent.
Id.
149 Id. at 35.
150 Id. at 34-35.
.51 Id. at 29.
152 Id. (quoting Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 160
(1989)).
153 id.
154 MARTIN J. ADELMAN ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON PATENT LAW 133 (2d ed.
2003).
"s See TrafFix, 532 U.S. at 29-30.
156 Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 164-69 (1995) (discussing
the "functionality doctrine"). See supra notes 67-71, 101-106 and accompanying text.
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Samara decision. 157 This ruling helps preserve the tradeoff between
public access and inventor's rights, which remains at the core of patent
law. Trademark is not allowed, in this particular instance, to snatch and
protect public domain material relinquished by the patent system.
2. The Line between Trademark and Copyright
Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp.158 has two
distinctions: it is one of the most significant recent affirmations of the
importance of the public domain, and it ensures that subject matter
protected by the Intellectual Property Clause of the Constitution actually
passes into the public domain when its protection expires. The issue
resolved by Dastar was "whether section 43(a) of the Lanham Act...
prohibits the unaccredited copying of a work no longer under
copyright."'
159
In Dastar, the Supreme Court addressed a claim by Twentieth
Century Fox that Dastar Corporation copied a formerly copyrighted
television series without giving proper credit and was thus guilty of
reverse passing off prohibited by § 43(a) of the Lanham Act.160 The work
at issue was a television series, "Crusade in Europe," in which Fox held
the copyright until 1977, when it was allowed to expire.' 61 "Crusade in
Europe" was based on General Dwight D. Eisenhower's book of the
same name, telling of the Allied campaign in World War II. Fox did
reacquire "the exclusive right to distribute the Crusade television series
on video and to sub-license others to do so" in 1988.162 In 1995, Dastar
produced its own video series entitled "World War II Campaigns in
Europe.' '163 All of the footage used for Dastar's series was obtained from
beta cam tapes of the original Crusade television series (now in the
157 Though the Court in TrafFix recognized that Samara was "careful to caution
against misuse or over-extension of trade dress," Tra/Fix, 532 U.S. at 29, the Samara
Court did not specifically differentiate between the bodies of intellectual property law.
The Court in TralFix, however, made its concerns about overlap between the bodies of
intellectual property law much more explicit, noting that the "Lanham Act does not exist
to reward manufacturers for their innovation in creating a particular device; that is the
purpose of the patent law and its period of exclusivity." Id. at 34.
158 Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23 (2003).
159 Stuart G. Richeson, Unattributed Copying of Work No Longer Protected by
Copyright, 51 LA. B.J. 218 (2003).
'oDastar Corp., 539 U.S. at 27.
161 Id. at 26.
162 ,[d.
163 id.
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public domain).' 64 Dastar's series did not recognize the Crusade
television series.1
65
The Ninth Circuit held that "Dastar's 'bodily appropriation' of Fox's
original [television] series [was] sufficient to establish the reverse
passing off.' 166 The Supreme Court, however, reversed this decision.
67
Central to the Court's holding was its determination that "origin of
goods," as used in § 43(a)(1)(A) of the Lanham Act, "refers only to the
manufacturer or producer of the physical 'goods' that are made available
to the public" rather than to "the creator of the underlying work" as
well.
161
Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act allows a civil action, like the one in
Dastar, when:
(1) Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or
services, or any container for goods, uses in commerce any word, term,
name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof, or any false
designation of origin, false or misleading description of fact, or false or
misleading representation of fact, which-
(A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to
deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or association of such
person with another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or
approval of his or her goods, services, or commercial activities by
another person. 69
The Dastar Court noted that § 43(a) has been interpreted to cover
both geographic origin and origin of production, as well as reverse
passing off as it is interpreted by many of the federal circuit courts.1
7 0
The Court was, however, quick to note that, "[b]ecause of its inherently
limited wording, § 43(a) can never be a federal 'codification' of the
overall law of 'unfair competition." 7''  As a result, the Court rejected
Fox's argument that "origin" should be read to include the creator of the
underlying work. 172 The Court held that "the phrase refers to the
producer of the tangible goods that are offered for sale, and not to the
author of any idea, concept, or communication embodied in those
goods.' 7 3
164 id
'6 5 d. at 27.
166 Id. at 28 (citations and footnote omitted).
167 Id. at 38.
16 8 Id. at 31.
169 Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2004).
170 See Dastar Corp., 539 U.S, at 29-30.
171 Id. at 29 (quoting 4 J. THOMAS McCARTHY, McCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND
UNFAIR COMPETITION § 27:7 (4th ed. 2002)).
172 Dastar Corp., 539 U.S. at 37.
173 id.
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If Fox had been allowed to assert rights of attribution over this
expired copyright, the Court believed the situation would be akin to
creating "a species of mutant copyright law that limits the public's
federal right to 'copy and to use,' expired copyrights."' 174 The policy
concerns of implying this right of attribution under § 43(a) for works
currently in the public domain are twofold: 1) the reputational interests
protected by a copyright would be extended by this approach far beyond
what is envisioned by the Copyright Act; and 2) a burden would be
placed on the public's ability to use and copy public domain material
because disclaimers would have to be included to avoid claims of
deception as to origin under § 43(a). 175 This decision was motivated by
concerns about the public domain and to avoid overlapping protection
between the bodies of intellectual property law. As the Court noted, "in
construing the Lanham Act, we have been 'careful to caution against
misuse or over-extension' of trademark and related protections into areas
traditionally occupied by patent or copyright." 176 Dastar was intended to
protect the "'carefully crafted bargain' under which, once the patent or
copyright monopoly has expired, the public may use the invention or
work at will and without attribution.'
77
Dastar preserves the bargain that runs through the branches of
intellectual property law. Had Fox won, the company would have
obtained part of the rights afforded it by the expired copyright via the
potentially perpetual protection of the Lanham Act. Not only does this
conflict with the underlying rationale behind the Act, 178 it also runs
contrary to the idea of "a limited time" as expressed in the Intellectual
Property Clause.179 Further, copyright's bargain with material entering
the public domain, and the full richness of the public domain envisioned
by this bargain, is protected by not requiring attribution.180
174 Id. (quoting Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 165
(1989)).
171 See Brandy A. Karl, Legal Update, Reverse Passing Off and Database
Protections: Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 9 B.U. J. ScI. & TECH.
L. 481, 487 (2003) (addressing issues raised by Dastar prior to the Court's decision in
that case).
176 Dastar Corp., 539 U.S. at 34 (quoting TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays,
Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 29 (2001)).
177 Id. (internal citation omitted).
178 Trademark law's primary purpose is generally characterized as reducing
consumer confusion. See DREYFUJSS & KWALL, supra note 19, at 7-8.
179 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, c1. 8.
180 See Howard J. Susser, Commentary: Supreme Court: Federal Lanham Act No
Help to Owners of Expired Copyrights, ANDREWS INTELL. PROP. LITIG. REP., July 22,
2003, at 13 (discussing the Supreme Court's holding in Dastar).
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IV. CONCLUSION
The aforementioned cases illustrate a trend by the United States
Supreme Court toward protecting the right to copy public domain
material under § 43 of the Lanham Act. It is unclear whether this trend
will extend beyond § 43, with its inherent danger of abuse and
overreaching, to other areas of intellectual property law. Regardless, the
decisions discussed in this note prevent erosion of the public domain,
emphasize the permissible role of copying, and indicate a focused effort
by the Court to protect the public domain on at least one defined front.
However, some scholars seem to downplay the significance of these
decisions. For example, Professor Rosemary J. Coombe cautions that
"[p]roponents of the public domain should be aware that if we focus too
exclusively upon concepts of fair use and the jurisprudence interpreting
the intersection of copyright, patent, trademark, and the First
Amendment, we are concerning ourselves with local ordinances in a
world of global interconnections.'' Coombe's argument addresses
larger ideas of a global "creative commons"' 82 and concerns about
appropriating, through intellectual property rights, the essence and value
of other cultures.1 83 On a theoretical level the public domain should, and
does, extend this far. However, in the context of the material discussed in
this note, Coombe's argument is inapposite.
From a practical point of view, courts do well to gently guide the
policy underlying intellectual property law. Courts must decide specific
issues within the confines of the statutory system established by
Congress to protect intellectual property. The cases in this note do not
address what may be larger problems in the realm of intellectual property
law, like protecting the global "creative commons"'84 or reconciling
American law on moral rights 185 with the rest of the world. Doing so
'8' Coombe, supra note 2, at 1182 (discussing the expansion of authorial rights in
intellectual property as harming the public domain and appropriating from other cultures
their value and essence).
112 id. at 181.
183 See id.
184id
185 Moral rights is a copyright doctrine that essentially "protects a creator's personal,
as opposed to economic interests in her work." DREYFUSS & KWALL, supra note 19, at
319. It is widely recognized throughout most of the world, but only in a very limited
fashion in the U.S. The doctrine often provides for a right of disclosure, a right of
attribution, and a right of integrity in a work. Id. Section 6b of the Berne Convention,
which the U.S. joined in 1988, explicitly recognizes moral rights. The United States,
however, does not explicitly recognize moral rights, believing that the law as it stands
protects artists sufficiently. Id. at 320. Congress did make a small move toward the
recognition of moral rights through the Visual Artists Rights Act ("VARA"), passed as an
amendment to the 1976 Copyright Act in 1990. VARA "provides creators of visual art
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would be difficult, possibly even inappropriate. Arguably, Congress or
organizations like the World Intellectual Property Organization
("WIPO"), rather than the courts, are in a better position to shape
intellectual property policy at the global level. What these cases do
address is the extent to which people may exercise property rights over
ideas and inventions within the framework of statutes like the Lanham
Act, and, consequently, how much the public will be free to copy-
which is the core concern of many critics of strong intellectual property
protections. 1
86
Recent years have seen an expansion in some aspects of intellectual
property rights. As Professor A. Samuel Oddi notes, this expansion has
taken a number of forms:
The duration of protection has been increased for certain titles.
Certain terminated copyrights have been given new life .... [L]ower
substantive standards of protection are being applied. There is
overlapping protection of the same subject matter by different forms of
intellectual protection delaying full entrance of that subject matter into
the public domain.187
One example of the type of expansion Professor Oddi mentions also
appeared in one of the most notable and recent cases: Eldred v. Ashcroft.
In January 2003, the Supreme Court upheld an increase in the term of
pre-1978 copyrights from seventy-five years to ninety-five years.
188
This term extension is a far cry from the fourteen-year term provided by
the first Copyright Act or the first extension of the term to twenty-eight
years in 1909.189
Professor Lawrence Lessig served as the lead attorney on Eldred,
arguing that the term extension was unconstitutional, as it was
inconsistent with the mandate of "limited Times" in the Intellectual
... with relatively limited rights of attribution and integrity when modifications to their
works are made that will prejudice their honor or reputation." Id at 320-21.
186 See generally Boyle, supra note 2 (arguing that intellectual property may be
analogized to real property in many ways and that we are experiencing a "second
enclosure movement" restricting the public domain); Coombe, supra note 2; Lessig,
Architecture of Innovation, supra note 51; A. Samuel Oddi, The Tragicomedy of the
Public Domain in Intellectual Property Law, 25 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 1 (2002)
(examining the interaction between the public domain and private domain and noting
expansions in the private domain). But ef Wagner, supra note 4 (arguing that increasing
intellectual property controls might not actually lead to a contraction of the public
domain).
187 Oddi, supra note 186, at 6-7 (citations omitted).
188 See Eldred v. Ashcrofl, 537 U.S. 186 (2003).
189 See Jason Krause, The Education of Larry Lessig, 90 A.B.A. J. 37,41 (2004).
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Property Clause.' 90 This argument did not convince the Court, in part
because accepting it could result in chaos; carrying the argument to its
logical end Would require invalidating the 1976 Copyright Act along
with its term extensi6ns) 91 Since Eldred, Professor Lessig has been
thinking about new approaches to revitalize the public domain and
protect the balance in intellectual property law as he sees fit. One of his
current ideas is to require copyright holders to pay a nominal fee before
the end of their current term to maintain the copyright.192 This system
would allow "companies like Disney [to] keep their lucrative properties
without putting unused works under restrictive copyright protections.'
193
Whether such initiatives will gain enough support to be put into practice
has yet to be seen. 
.
Eldred and the § 43 cases discussed in this note exemplify the mixed
treatment the public domain receives from the Supreme Court. It is
possible to reconcile the two groups, but doing so is often speculative.
For instance, it simply may be that the Court views § 43 as particularly
vulnerable to use as a backdoor for gaining rights beyond those
envisioned by the bargains in the various bodies of intellectual property
law. Further; it may be that each case is approached independently, using
the overarching, tradeoffs and objectives of intellectual property law,
including recognition of the role of the public domain, to come to a
decision.
Ultimately, what appears to be varying regard for encroachments on
the public domain by the Court is most easily explained by the tie that
binds the cases in this note: § 43 of the Lanham Act. The nature of § 43
almost invites attempts to protect subject matter not typically protected
under the Lanham Act, or subject matter that is amenable to protection
under either patent or copyright law. Eldred is different because, in that
case, the Court was only concemed with the term of the copyright and
not with the intersection of the bodies of intellectual property law in a
way that could lead to abuse of the system. 194 However, it is worth noting
that all of these cases still affect the public domain in terms of when, and
190 Id. at 37. See also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (giving Congress the power "to
promote the Progress of Sciefice and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries").
191 Krause, supra note 189, at 41 (noting this concern as expressed by Justice Breyer
during the Eldred argument).
192 Lawrence Lessig, Editorial, Protecting Mickey Mouse at Art's Expense, N.Y.
TIMES, January 18, 2003, at A]7.
193 Krause, supra note 189, at 39. Professor Lessig finds this approach particularly
appealing because of "a Congressional Research Service estimate that only 2 percent of
works published between 1923 and 1942 have any commercial value. Yet use of the 98
percent of works ... is restricted to protect the 2 percent." Id. at 39-40.
114 See ElIdred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S 186, 192 (2003).
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how much, material enters it. As seen in the language of cases like
TraJFix,95 the Court is clearly mindful of the effect its decisions have on
the public domain. However, it is also clear that this is not the controlling
concern in all cases.
Cases continue to come down in ways that alternately expand and
contract the public domain. For example, in the recent case of KP
Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc. 196 the Court
resolved a circuit split to make it easier for defendants to assert the fair
use defense' 97 to a claim of infringement of a registered trademark. 198
This decision represents another small step toward safeguarding the right
to copy and use material in the public domain, with regard to registered
trademarks.
Nonetheless, the policy results of recent Supreme Court decisions
interpreting § 43 of the Lanham Act clearly favored free copying of
public domain material and rejected further expansion of intellectual
property rights. This line of cases represents a strong acknowledgement
by the Court of the need to maintain a vibrant public domain.
Reconciling the cases in this note with other decisions that are widely
acknowledged to limit the robustness of the public domain is the difficult
part. Whether the trend toward maintaining access to a real public
domain, evidenced by the cases in this note and hoped for by scholars
like Professor Lessig, will continue to expand has yet to be seen.
Regardless, such an emphatic reaffirmation of copying as the Dastar
decision1 99 must lead one to ask whether some are prematurely mourning
the demise of the public domain.2 °0
195 TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 29 (2001)
("[a]llowing competitors to copy will have salutary effects in many instances"). See also
Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 146 ("[f]rom their
inception, the federal patent laws have embodied a careful balance between the need to
promote innovation and the recognition that imitation and refinement through imitation
are both necessary to invention itself and the very lifeblood of a competitive economy.").
196 KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 125 S. Ct. 542
(2004).
197 See Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4) (2004) (stating that an affirmative
defense of fair use to a claim of infringement is available to a party whose "use of the
name, term, or device charged to be an infringement is a use, otherwise than as a mark
... used fairly and in good faith only to describe the goods or services of such party, or
their geographic origin.").
198 The circuit split at issue in KP Permanent Make-Up involved whether a party
asserting the fair use defense under § 1115(b)(4) had to show that there was not a
likelihood of confusion in order to prevail on the defense. The Court. ruled that such a
showing is not required to assert the defense, but that the likelihood of confusion can help
inform whether a use is fair or not. See KP Permanent Make-Up, 125 S.Ct. at 549-51.
199 Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23 (2003).
200 See, e.g., supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text.
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